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REGULATORY BARRIERS IN AN INTEGRATING 
WORLD FOOD MARKET 
Dawn D. Thilmany and Christopher B. Barrett 
ABSTRACT 
I Introduction 
REGULATORY BARRIERS IN AN INTEGRATING 
WORLD FOOD MARKETl 
"As technology invades agriculture, more and more agricultural disputes 
will turn on the use of additives, pesticides, drugs and genes. JJ 
"Brie and Hormones," The Economist (Jan. 7, 1989) 
Policy and technological change (e.g., in communications and transport technologies) appear 
to be steadily integrating the world's national and regional food markets. Recent trade liberalization 
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have especially raised expectations of 
increasingly free and profitable cross-border commercial opportunities for American agricultural 
producers and processors. Improved market access under GATT and NAFT A, through tariff 
reduction and the conversion of quotas to tariffs ("tariffication"), holds out the promise of greater 
commercial food trade. But while recent trade agreements have addressed readily identifiable, 
traditional trade barriers such as quotas and tariffs, there nonetheless remain significant regulatory 
barriers to international trade in foodstuffs. 
This paper considers the economics of regulatory barriers to international food trade, as well 
as their implications for policymakers and for U.S. agribusinesses looking to expand into foreign 
markets. Regulatory barriers appear to be growing in both absolute and relative terms, and have 
been the subject of some heated disputes, such as that over beef hormones with the European 
Community, with Canada over potato grading, with China about its wheat sanitary standards, and 
IThe authors are both assistant professors in the Department of Economics, Utah State University, Logan, UT 
84322-3530. Seniority of authorship is shared equally. We thank Chuck Nicholson for helpful comments. This work 
was supported by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station and approved as journal paper 4852. 
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with South Korea over produce inspection and meat shelf-life standards. Our primary objective in 
this paper is to call attention to the more complex economics of these non-traditional trade barriers, 
and thereby stimulate more serious research and teaching on the topic. Good empirical research on 
regulatory barriers is in especially short supply. We know disturbingly little about the degree to 
which regulatory barriers raise transactions and other costs, restrict trade, and influence consumer 
demand or patterns of international trade and investment. 
Several recent studies have pointed out the frequency and complexity of regulatory trade 
barriers and the challenges and issues they present for future trade liberalization efforts (N daysienga 
and Kinsey; Sykes). Traditional trade theory must be integrated with the theories and methods of 
industrial organization, information economics, and political economy in order to effectively address 
the economics of regulatory barriers. This paper is a simple first step in that direction. As a specific 
case in point, this paper considers post-NAFT A regulatory barriers to dairy trade, including their 
influence on U.S. firms' strategies with respect to the Mexican market. 
II Global and Agricultural Trade Trends and Policies 
The increasing integration of national economies in part reflects steady decreases in real 
communication and transportation costs that reduce trade between spatially distinct markets. This 
phenomenon is especially important to trade in agricultural products because of their low value-to-
bulk ratio and their perishability. Growing trade volumes are also attributable to a succession of 
trade liberalization accords that have steadily expanded coverage in both spatial and economic terms, 
and dramatically cut average duties and the incidence of quotas on covered commodities (Table 1). 
Agriculture was largely exempt from most multilateral trade agreements before NAFTA and 
the Uruguay Round, and agricultural trade growth has lagged behind broader growth in merchandise 
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trade (Figure 1), in part due to slower trade liberalization.2 Indeed, the volume of agricultural trade 
subject to nontariff barriers increased in virtually all countries until the early 1990s. Average 
nominal levels of protection in agriculture were almost 15 times manufacturing tariff rates in the 
industrial countries in 1992 (Ingco). A wide range of policy measures protected domestic 
agricultural producers and penalized consumers, including those in North America (Figures 2 & 3). 
Trade liberalization for agricultural products was thus one of the primary goals of both 
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. In general, NAFTA and the earlier Canada-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) went much further than GATT in eliminating tariffs and quotas on 
trade in agricultural products within North America. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how much 
the reduction or removal of traditional trade barriers will stimulate commercial agricultural trade 
between the signatory countries. Regulatory barriers remain an important potential obstacle. 
III The Economics of Regulatory Barriers 
Regulatory barriers are likely to become increasingly common, in both absolute and relative 
terms, as importables industries lobby for regulatory protection in the face of the steady, negotiated 
erosion in tariff rates documented in Table 1. Meanwhile, improved standards of living fuel 
long-term growth in demand for consumer product safety, information and quality-differentiation, 
providing a parallel channel of increased pressure on governments to regulate imported commercial 
products. Government size and power facilitates the enactment and enforcement of regulatory 
barriers to trade for producer protectionist or consumer welfare purposes or both. This section 
presents some simple analytics of how regulatory barriers affect prices, output, welfare and trade. 
2Structural factors (e.g., low income elasticities of demand for agricultural commodities) have also played a 
major role. 
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The economics of regulatory barriers helps elucidate why the political economy of food regulation 
can be particularly complex and the great need for careful empirical research in this area. 
According to official estimates, there are over 100 types of nontariff measures (NTMs) in 
place worldwide (Ndayisenga and Kinsey), a substantial portion of which are classified as "technical 
barriers," a term used to describe potential obstacles to trade associated with product attributes. 
Technical barriers comprise two distinct, hierarchically ordered subsets: "product standards" and 
"regulations." Following Sykes, the distinction is that firms comply with "standards" voluntarily 
(e.g., computer and electronics compatibility) while they are legally bound to abide by "regulations." 
We are concerned with the latter sort, state-imposed product attributes; hence our use of the term 
"regulatory barriers." 
Both the Uruguay Round and NAFT A reiterate nations' rights to maintain stringent health 
and safety regulations and to prohibit imports not meeting these standards. Indeed, subnational 
jurisdictions (e.g., the state of California) can also unilaterally enact such regulations. These 
regulatory barriers are to be supported by scientific criteria, although the evidentiary standards for 
"scientific" criteria are as unclear as the mechanisms to settle disputes.3 Regulatory barriers thereby 
provide a method to continue protection of domestic markets from import competition. Yet, unlike 
conventional trade barriers like quotas, one cannot automatically conclude that regulatory barriers 
are therefore social welfare reducing. 
All governments impose health and safety, environmental protection, product labelling, and 
many other sorts of standards on domestic and foreign produced goods. Product quality and safety 
3F or instance, the dispute between the U.S. and the European Community over beef growth hormones and meat 
inspection procedures began in 1985 and is still not fully resolved. Similarly, China has barred imports of grain from 
the u.S. Northwest on the basis of sanitary standards despite 20 years of scientific evidence that u.S. grains pose no 
such risk to China. 
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regulations can be beneficial as means to resolve imperfect information problems that can lead to 
low-quality market equilibria4 or socially superoptimal risk bearing. Product labelling and safety 
regulations may thus increase effective demand by relieving consumers' concerns about product 
quality. This is a principal way in which regulatory barriers differ from tariffs, quotas and other 
more traditional trade barriers: hey may stimulate demand. In so doing, they cannot only increase 
domestic producers' welfare but consumer welfare, too. On the other hand, regulatory barriers can 
be just a trade quota disguised in scientific rhetoric. 5 The key problem is thus distinguishing 
between product regulation that resolves information-based market failures, which can increase net 
social welfare, and those that simply protect domestic producers, thereby reducing net social welfare. 
The complication is that both have the same observable price effects. The effects of regulatory 
barriers on trade volumes and aggregate welfare are thus analytically ambiguous. 
Figure 4 explains this complexity using a three-panel graph depicting each of two trading 
countries' markets and the international marketplace. Consider the impact of regulatory barriers 
imposed by an importing nation (Country 1) on trade volumes, prices and aggregate welfare in both 
its own economy and that of its trading partner (Country 2). Under free trade, and assuming no 
transfer costs, the equilibrium price in both nations is PA, with consumption (production) at point B 
(A) in country 1 and at point L(K) in country 2, implying a trade volume equal to B - A = K - L = b.6 
4Economists will recognize this as the "market for lemons" problem (Akerlof). 
5This has been an issue in domestic agricultural marketing for years. Famous dairy product cases include an 
Illinois company's challenge of Wisconsin laws prohibiting the sale of chocolate milk substitutes (Dean Foods v. 
Wisconsin) and a Wisconsin company's challenge to Ohio regulations prohibiting the sale of a condensed milk substitute 
containing 6 percent coconut oil (Hebe v. Calvert). 
6Note we use subscripts to identify the country, uppercase letters to identify country-specific effects, and 
lowercase letters to identify trade volumes in the international market. 
6 
Regulatory barriers in country 1 increase the cost of exporting into 1 (assuming there are no effects 
on the domestic supply schedule?), thus shifting 2's excess supply schedule to the left (from ES2 to 
ES'2). If there are no demand-stimulus effects from the regulatory trade barriers, as should occur 
when they resolve uncertainty over product quality or safety, then prices rise (from P I A to P I B), trade 
volume declines (from B - A to b - c, equivalently from b to a), and aggregate welfare declines (by 
ABCD) in country 1, relative to the free trade benchmark.8 But what if government 1 's regulatory 
control of imports resolves consumer concerns about product quality and safety, thereby stimulating 
demand (from D I to D'I in the leftmost panel and from ED I to ED'I in the rightmost one)? There will 
again be higher prices than under free trade (PIC instead of PIA), but trade volumes and aggregate 
welfare could be greater (if and only if c > b and EFGH > ABE, respectively) than under free trade. 
Moreover, if and only if the demand-side effects of the regulatory barriers sufficiently stimulate 
demand such that trade volume is greater (less) than the free trade equilibrium, i.e., c > b (b > c), 
then prices and aggregate welfare rise (fall) in Country 2, e.g., from p2A to p2C and by KLMN, 
respectively, in Figure 4. This implies that exporting firms in country 2 can be made better offby 
demand-stimulating regulatory barriers imposed by the government in country 1. 
The trade volume and aggregate welfare effects of regulatory trade restrictions are thus 
analytically ambiguous. Since the information provided by a regulatory barrier to consumers is the 
key to its welfare effects, we henceforth distinguish between "informative" and "uninformative" 
barriers. Note that while importing country consumer surplus unambiguously falls with the 
imposition of an uninformative regulatory barrier and changes ambiguously with an informative one, 
7This is equivalent to saying that domestic suppliers already meet an informal product standard that the 
government begins to enforce as a legal regulation on foreign competitors. 
8Prices and welfare fall in Country 2, from P 2 A to P 2 B and by the area IJKL, respectively. 
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importing country producer surplus rises in either case. Importables producers prefer an informative 
barrier to an uninformative one, due to demand (and thus price) expansion effects, but they prefer 
either sort of regulatory trade barrier to free trade. This creates strong incentives for producers to 
lobby for regulatory barriers, whether or not they are informative. This makes the political economy 
of regulatory barriers complex, for if producers "cry wolf' too often, policymakers may begin to 
disregard their claims of potentially Pareto-improving regulatory barriers, and prospective 
improvements to aggregate welfare may be foregone. Yet if producers' claims are accepted 
uncritically, government intervention may come at substantial social cost. 
Under certain circumstances, a free market might endogenously ensure product quality in 
manufactures, largely eliminating the prospect for welfare-enhancing government product 
regulation.9 But this is unlikely to occur in food safety and health matters because of information 
problems (Sykes), or when firms' ex ante market share is quite uneven, as is often true in cases of 
international trade. Product quality and safety standards can alleviate consumer uncertainty about 
the wholesomeness of a product, thereby stimulating demand. Hence, collective action efforts 
designed to produce universally agreeable product safety and labelling standards, such as the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (Codex) or the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
provide a minimum standard, although these standards are difficult to establish and may not address 
controversial issues. 10 Higher prices result for quality-regulated products, but it is not entirely clear 
9F or instance, in networks characterized by consumption externalities in which no one fIrm holds a dominant 
position fIrms, may freely cooperate to establish product standards. For a good introduction to the literature on product 
compatability and network externalities see the symposium in the Spring 1994 issue of the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 
IOYang and Barrett (1996) also show that importing nations have strong incentives not to comply with agreed 
international standards. 
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whether regulatory barriers increase prices mainly by increasing production and transaction costs 
and thereby restricting supply, as seems the common belief, or by resolving product quality and 
safety uncertainty and thereby stimulating demand. 11 
Why are regulatory barriers threatening? Five broad reasons are summarized here. First, they 
involve technical policy matters that tend to receive less public scrutiny and thus may be more 
subject to interest group "capture" by producer groups seeking government protection against 
foreign competition. The political economy of defensible protection prompts some governments to 
use consumer safety issues as a means to justify domestic producer protection. Ironically, trade 
negotiations, such as NAFT A, by stripping away traditional protection by quotas or tariffs may 
provide an incentive to develop more complex, less transparent means to protect domestic industries. 
Such trade protection may be less vulnerable to criticism from outside parties, especially if trade 
barriers are tied to politically sensitive topics such as food safety (Chambers and Pick; Kramer), an 
issue of increasing prominence in international trade (Ndayisenga and Kinsey). Where regulatory 
trade barriers are highly product specific, they may also yield greater firm- or industry-specific 
benefits than more general quotas and tariffs, thereby fuelling more intense lobbying on the part of 
industry beneficiaries by the logic of collective action (Olson). This issue is especially important 
in processed foods manufacturing where product differentiation can create monopolistically 
competitive industries that easily lapse into inefficient, noncompetitive markets if trade barriers 
restrict the competition from imperfect (imported) substitutes. 
IIMethodological research in disentangling the demand- and supply-side effects of product quality and safety 
standards is badly needed. The dearth of good empirical research on regulatory barriers-their incidence, and the degree 
to which they affect costs, trade volumes, market structure and prices-is a serious impediment to policymaking and 
agribusiness decision-making in this area. 
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Second, regulatory barriers are unusually subject to differential and disputed enforcement, 
creating uncertainty and incentives for corruption (Sykes). As the extensive literature on rent-
seeking and the political economy of trade quotas makes clear, any time government drives a wedge 
between the world and domestic market prices and must certify those who move product between 
the two markets, there are incentives to bribe and cheat to capture rents. Consumers soon discover 
substandard quality goods that obviously evaded product regulations, with adverse effects on 
consumer confidence and demand, sometimes leading to a low-quality market equilbrium. 12 Hence, 
the emphasis placed on transparent weights, measures and quality standards in contemporary 
agricultural marketing reforms internal to developing and transition economies. Uninformative 
regulatory barriers may create similar problems in international marketing. 
Third, regulatory barriers are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify as tariff equivalents, thus 
impeding negotiation toward liberalized access. As Sykes (p. 10) puts it, "they are often hidden in 
the firm-specific costs of modifying a product to meet a standard or regulation, in the costs of testing 
and certification procedures and their attendant delays, or in the ways that noncompliance with a 
standard may affect consumer purchasing decisions." Much as many economists disdain tax breaks 
instead of explicit subsidies for special interests because the former hide the true cost of the policy, 
so do regulatory barriers disguise the extent of trade distortion in an economy. The conversion of 
quotas to tariffs ("tariffication") has been central to multilateral trade agreements. While there are 
broadly accepted methods for calculating tariff equivalents for quotas, there are no such methods for 
regulatory barriers. The producer and consumer subsidy equivalents depicted in Figures 2,3, 5, and 
6, for instance, do not capture the effects of product certification, labelling, or safety standards 
12Similar stories about milk marketing in Asia prompted Akerlofs "market for lemons" model. 
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because there are not yet accepted means to measure those effects. Thus, while enormous progress 
has been made over the past half century in reducing quotas and tariffs, international negotiations 
over regulatory barriers have been largely unsuccessful. 
Fourth, regulatory barriers are often episodic, enacted in response to heightened political 
pressure or events.13 Even if subsequently rescinded, they create costly uncertainty for exporters. 
Fifth, regulatory barriers add to transactions costs, thereby countering in part the benefits of the 
costs of trade which are declining. As Sykes puts it (p. 2) "even when conformity to foreign 
standards and regulations is not difficult, the burden of demonstrating conformity to the satisfaction 
of consumers or regulators abroad can still be considerable" (emphasis in original). 
These concerns are especially pronounced in agricultural trade, particularly in subsectors like 
the dairy industry where attributes relating to food quality and safety are commonly governed by 
regulations. Health concerns expressed by consumer groups may be exploited by special interests 
seeking protection. Delays resulting from certification are most costly with perishable products 14 
and can be a serious obstacle in low-margin industries such as dairy. 
Regulatory barriers are also likely to increase. First, food safety is a luxury good, and 
long-term increases in real incomes will fuel greater demand for legitimate regulatory barriers. 
Consumers are willing to pay a premium for safer food products (Eom). However, prices and 
perceptions of potential food safety risks appear to affect preferences more than does technical 
information, making it possible to manipulate consumer demand and grass-roots political support 
l3The U.S. response to Canadian beef imports following e.coli poisoning in the Pacific Northwest a few years 
ago is an example. 
14Consider, for instance, a recently settled dispute with South Korea. Meat products were assigned a 30-day 
shelf life (down from the previously recommended 90 days), which represented barely enough time for the products 
to clear customs. 
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for regulatory barriers. Second, product variety is also a luxury good, and increasing product 
differentiation within food manufacturing industries concentrates the gains from precise regulatory 
barriers and opens up opportunities for the exercise of market power where government regulation 
restricts competition by foreign producers. Third, with traditional quota and tariffbarriers restricted 
by international treaties, protectionist pressures are increasingly concentrating on regulatory barriers. 
As with consumer preferences and incomes, national standards differ greatly across countries, giving 
rise to regulated product standards. It is costly for a firm to comply with varying regulatory 
standards, an issue likely to become more important as firms market in more countries. Fourth, 
increasingly sophisticated chemically and genetically engineered production and processing 
technologies (e.g., BST hormone) raise new issues of product safety. 
While there is little systematic empirical evidence of the frequency, magnitude, or effects of 
regulatory barriers to agricultural trade, these barriers may be more common than one might surmise 
from the international trade literature, and are particularly prevalent in industries such as dairy. 
Ndaysienga and Kinsey measured the frequency and type of nontariffbarriers in developed countries 
but were limited by two factors: (1) most of the EC countries did not keep a record of health and 
safety standards as trade regulations, and (2) unlike tariffs, regulatory barriers provide little or no 
information on the impact they have on the economics of trade. Table 2 summarizes their results. 
In general, health and safety measures are among the most common regulatory trade barriers. Dairy 
products, meat products, and fruits and vegetables were the most frequently regulated agricultural 
products in the reporting countries, and the results are probably similar in other, nonreporting 
countries. For instance, Devinney and Hightower estimated creation of an open internal European 
Community (EC) market resulted in a $910 million reduction in costs associated with regulation of 
12 
Ee food industries. While little is known about the empirics of regulatory barriers, there are 
important and political economy reasons to be concerned about them, to anticipate they will grow, 
in both absolute and relative (to more traditional trade barriers) terms, and that they are of particular 
importance to agricultural trade, especially in higher-value-added, quality-differentiated products 
of the sort U.S. agribusinesses are increasingly attempting to export abroad and to market 
domestically in the face of foreign competition. 
IV. Implications for Strategies for Expanding Markets Internationally 
Business growth generally depends on expanding one's market, including foreign market 
entry through trade or direct investment. Firms weigh alternative market entry and operations 
strategies, taking into consideration the usual demand and supply characteristics of the market under 
consideration as well as policy variables such as exchange rates and trade restrictions. This section 
focuses on how regulatory trade barriers might influence patterns of cross-border market entry. 
International market expansion is inherently risky. Perhaps the most obvious obstacle to 
cross-border commercial operations comes from exchange rate risk. But direct investment also 
involves political risk of asset expropriation and (sometimes) restrictions on the rate of profits 
repatriation, while trade adds uncertainty associated with tariffs, quotas, and regulatory barriers to 
exchange rate risk. Extensive study and historical exchange rate data make exchange rate risk 
manageable for finns, especially through currency futures, options and forward markets that enable 
firms to defray or eliminate the exchange rate risk associated with all major currencies over periods 
of up to one or two years. Moreover, market power may permit pricing strategies that offset some 
currency risk (Pick and Park). 
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The uncertainty posed by regulatory barriers or possible asset expropriation is qualitatively 
different from exchange rate risk. Political risk assessment, although less scientific than exchange 
rate risk assessment, is likewise familiar to a firm's bankers, if not its Board. But regulatory barrier 
uncertainty remains relatively obscure. Fox and Tversky note that people and firms shy away from 
unfamiliar and unquantifiable uncertainty, in favor of the familiar and the quantifiable. If 
agribusinesses likely follow this rule, regulatory barriers of uncertain duration, enforcement, and 
evidentiary standards may serve to discourage trade at the margin. Indeed, policymakers in some 
parts of the world allegedly advance regulatory barriers not only as a form of protection for domestic 
producers but also as a blunt incentive to induce foreigners to invest locally, thereby stimulating 
local employment and services. Alternatively, foreign firms faced with uncertain regulatory barriers 
may enter into joint ventures or marketing alliances with indigenous firms, some of which may 
directly enrich regulators. 
While regulatory barriers may serve to induce some substitution of direct investment (or 
other nontrade forms of market entry) for trade, we suspect that these effects are dominated by a 
general market entry deterrence brought about because trade is the primary channel through which 
most firms resolve uncertainty with respect to political risk. Businesses typically use trade to 
establish relationships with potential partners in licensing or direct foreign investment; direct 
investment without significant prior commercial interaction is relatively rare. We hypothesize that 
dampening trade thus hurts the process of discovery that ultimately encourages foreign investment. 
Given that the source and nature of uncertainty are of great significance to firms and that 
compliance with legally required product standards is costly, regulatory barriers are amajor obstacle 
to international market integration unless they effectively stimulate demand by addressing consumer 
14 
concerns about product quality or safety. Although traditional trade barriers are gradually 
disappearing, the persistence, much less the expansion, of regulatory barriers may lessen the gains 
from free trade. This is especially true for agriculture. The increased popularity and proliferation 
of processed food products means these barriers will become even more important to potential 
exporters. The proliferation of product variety has accompanied rising incomes in developed 
countries and similar demand conditions would be expected in strengthening middle-income 
economies, like Mexico' s. We must better understand the relationship between food safety 
regulations and consumer demand in order to distinguish informative regulatory barriers from 
uninformative ones, and to establish which regulatory controls on trade should be treated as 
remaining obstacles to the efficient international flow of goods, services and investment capital. 
V. The Example of Post-NAFTA North American 
Dairy Trade 
GATT and NAFTA terms considerably improved market access in North America, not least 
of which for U.S. dairy exports to Mexico, the primary direction of dairy trade in North America. 
While there is strong long-term potential for rapid U.S. dairy export growth to Mexico, the 
emergence of new obstacles, of which regulatory barriers are perhaps the most likely, could pose 
problems in important market niches. We thus use the example of North American dairy trade to 
highlight a few features of regulatory barriers' effects on international trade and agribusiness market 
expansIon. 
Dairy products are one of the most protected agricultural commodities worldwide. North 
American dairy market CSEs and PSEs are greater in magnitude than the corresponding measures 
for agriculture more broadly (compare Figures 5 and 6 with Figures 2 and 3). Signatory countries 
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to the Uruguay Round, including the three North American nations, committed to (1) reduce internal 
support to the dairy industry by 20%, relative to 1986-88 base levels, (2) convert all quotas and 
import licenses to tariffs and reduce these by at least 15% from 1986-88 base levels, and (3) 
maintain import access amounting to at least 3% of each market for each product, based on 1986-90 
consumption volumes, and increase import access to at least 5% by the year 2000. Budgetary 
reductions have already reduced internal support in the North American countries, but the other 
criteria must still be implemented. U.S. dairy quotas are being converted to tariff-rate quotas 
(TRQs). Under NAFTA, Mexican and U.S. dairy TRQs have a zero tariff within quota, and 
out-of-quota tariffs are to be phased out within 15 years. Import licenses have historically been the 
greatest barrier to entry into the Mexican market, and Canada must accept more dairy imports to 
reach the 3% import access requirement of GATT.I5 U.S. producers and processors are 
well-positioned to take advantage of these developments. 16 
The Uruguay Round also affects export subsidies. U.S. dairy exports to Mexico reached 
record levels in 1993, and exports were nearly as high in 1994 despite reduced sales under the Dairy 
Export Incentive Program (DEIP). Indeed, U.S. commercial exports of dairy products to Mexico 
have increased steadily and rapidly. Mexico is the world's largest importer ofNDM and the largest 
purchaser of U.S. dairy products, accounting for about 20% of U.S. nonfat dried milk (NDM) 
15U.S. market access will likewise need to expand to reach the 5% minimum by the year 2000. Few economists 
predict any increase in Canadian or u.s. dairy imports beyond GAIT's minimum access requirements since 
above-quota tariff rates will remain prohibitively high. 
16To date, there are no major movements of dairy products north out of Mexico nor south from Canada, so these 
issues concern almost exclusively u.s. exports in the near term. In the longer run, however, it is quite possible that 
Mexican, or less probably Canadian, dairy products will be exported in substantial volume. 
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exports (USDA). The required 21 % reduction in subsidized export volumes (36% of value) will 
have a major effect on NDM exports. 
Mexico is expected to be a primary market for world trade as its economy strengthens and 
per capita income increases. Increasing population and incomes in Mexico will increase food 
imports from the United States, a trend intensified by NAFT A, if interrupted briefly by Mexico's 
1995 recession. In addition to trends in aggregate demand, policy reforms have also made the 
Mexican dairy market far more attractive to American agribusinesses. For decades, the Mexican 
government placed price controls on almost all basic foods, including milk. In March 1994, the 
government eliminated price controls for all commodities except milk. The monopoly position of 
CONASUPO (the Mexican government's agricultural supply management agency) with respect to 
food imports has been weakened substantially.I7 Anticipating increased Mexican demand for 
value-added products and a more competitive marketplace in which to operate, many U.S. dairies, 
co-ops, and processors became interested in trade and marketing alliances with and direct investment 
in Mexico. 
Shelf-stable (ultra-high temperature, or UHT) milk is one dairy product for which the 
Mexican market seems attractive. Urban middle and upper class consumers purchase UHT milk as 
a status product. Moreover, the limited refrigerated distribution channels for fluid milk and limited 
access to safe water offer an attractive market for shelf-stable milk among a subpopulation presently 
absent from commercial markets for dairy products. 18 The massive devaluation of the Mexican peso 
17A subsidy for milk consumption to low-income families is provided through CONASUPO's dairy products 
affiliate, LICONSA. 
18 According to United Nations data, 94% of Mexico 's urban population had access to safe water, but only 66% 
of its approximately 28 million rural residents did (UNDP). 
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from late December 1994 through mid-April 1995 sharply reduced both the competitiveness of U.S. 
dairy products in Mexican markets and Mexican demand for dairy products. 19 Yet, in some niches 
of the dairy market, like UHT, regulatory barriers, including some implemented post-NAFTA, 
already threatened trade. 
Procedures for the importation of almost all agricultural products, including processed foods, 
are poorly defined in Mexico. Health certificates are required for imported fluid milk, NDM, yogurt, 
whey, butter, butteroil, ice cream, and cheese (Cox et al.). Mexican dairy product safety standards 
are strict but inconsistently enforced, which poses a real obstacle for some dairy producers and 
processors. Moreover, the regulations themselves change. For example, in early 1995, Mexico 
introduced a 48-hour shelf-life standard from the time of pasteurization for imported packaged milk, 
effectively eliminating the Mexican export market for U.S. producers of the UHT product. There 
is no evidence that this regulatory barrier in any way stimulates Mexican demand for UHT milk by 
allaying consumer concerns about product safety. Although scientifically indefensible, the barrier 
poses a serious, if perhaps temporary, obstacle and, along with the peso devaluation, effectively 
discouraged at least one major U.S. UHT supplier from pursuing Mexican distribution possibilities, 
either through trade, marketing alliances, or direct investment. In short, dairy product trade among 
North American countries has significantly increased in the recent past and could accelerate with the 
removal of quotas and tariff reduction under NAFT A, but the market potential may still be hindered 
by regulatory uncertainties. 
19Income elasticities of demand for dairy products are typically superunitary, meaning demand for these 
products changes at a faster rate than, and in the same direction as, income. Devaluation sharply reduced real Mexican 
incomes and, subsequently, dairy product demand. 
18 
VI. Policy Implications and Summary Discussion 
In spite of growing integration among the world's food markets, most governments will likely 
continue to explore new methods of protecting industries. In addition to the traditional protectionist 
lobbying efforts of producers, governments are also responding to consumers' calls for improved 
product health, infonnation, and safety standards. Regulatory barriers to agricultural trade, 
especially in foodstuffs, are thus likely to proliferate. Recent trade agreements have largely failed 
to address the potential impact or increasing presence of regulatory trade barriers. Indeed, our 
analytical tools are as yet quite poorly adapted to incorporating such barriers (e.g., in the estimation 
of CSEs and PSEs) and the base of empirical research on regulatory barriers is inadequate for even 
terse analysis. 
The increasing integration of national economies means that "domestic" policies, such as 
product health and safety standards, increasingly affect international trade and investment patterns. 
The product standards governments adopt or enforce can have effects similar to those of quotas or 
tariffs: they may limit foreign supply, thereby driving up domestic prices and domestic producer 
surplus at the cost of aggregate welfare. An important difference, however, is that product standards 
can also mitigate consumer uncertainty over product attributes, especially on foodstuffs. So it is 
unclear what effects regulatory barriers have on domestic consumer surplus and aggregate welfare. 
Regulatory trade barriers can provide valuable food safety infonnation by merely attempting to 
reduce foreign competition or both. Analysis of regulatory barriers is consequently somewhat more 
complex than the study of traditional trade policy instruments. 
In deciding whether to adopt regulatory trade barriers, government must distinguish between, 
on the one hand, legitimate regulatory barriers that might allay consumer concerns about product 
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quality or safety, potentially inducing increased domestic consumer and producer surplus alike, and 
illegitimate barriers that protect importables' producers at substantial social cost, on the other. The 
current base of empirical research on regulatory barriers is far too thin to provide even useful rules 
of thumb at this stage. However, considerable recent research on the economics of food safety, 
product labelling and consumer uncertainty should facilitate improved policymaking in this area. 
The political economy of trade is an increasingly complex field of research. Regulatory 
barriers are technically oriented and thus tend to be less transparent protectionist policies than a 
quota or a tariff. Consequently, they may be attractive targets for rent-seeking by those who would 
benefit from their implementation. Similarly, regulatory barriers are unusually subj ect to differential 
and disputed enforcement, creating uncertainty and incentives for corruption. In both cases, 
import-competing industries (which Figure 4 demonstrates would consistently benefit from 
regulatory barriers) have an incentive to "cry wolf' about the need for improved food safety 
standards, whether they are necessary or not. 20 
In spite of trade liberalization agreements such as GATT, NAFTA, and CUSFTA, regulatory 
trade barriers may pose more serious and costly impediments. Regulatory barriers are far more 
widespread than is commonly perceived. They tend to be more episodic than either quotas or tariffs, 
and more costly and politically difficult to combat. Trade constraints well understood are being 
replaced by less clear regulatory standards that deter firms' ability to make management decisions. 
Because incomes and tastes vary across countries, national governments necessarily impose 
different regulatory standards on products entering their markets. This can create imperfect 
information problems for firms. Where trade impediments result from the failure to understand 
2<Note that these protected industries may not be certain of the legitimacy of the regulatory barrier either, but 
since they consistently gain from legitimate or illegitimate barriers, they will always support such policies. 
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foreign trade laws and cultural differences (Wehr), governments may be able to intervene efficiently. 
Firms with international interests have a strong and growing demand for trade information, 
certification, and testing services. Toward this end, some jurisdictions, e.g., Oregon's Department 
of Agriculture, have established export service centers to offer exporters assistance in complying 
with foreign trade regulations and certifications. 
Food markets are influenced by public policies and regulations. Establishing a uniform, 
scientifically based set of minimum specifications for all trading nations, as is done in GATT and 
Codex, would facilitate trade and protect national sovereignty over consumer safety issues to relieve 
some of the uncertainty about regulatory deterrents currently faced in the global market. True safety 
objectives involve complex technologies and standards, and may require the use of objective 
scientific panels. Recognizing that a broad spectrum of knowledge contributes to socialjudgment, 
policymakers might better serve the public by attempting to solicit and communicate the best 
available information, scientific, economic, or otherwise. 
Recent efforts to develop international standards with respect to food quality and safety, 
primarily through Codex Alimentarius, and agreements to restrict national policymaking discretion 
with regard to sanitary and phytosanitary measures reflect the importance of regulatory barriers to 
international commerce. Academic and industry researchers must address these issues using 
empirical analysis to delineate accurately the ambiguous results obtained from theoretical analysis. 
Currently, little is understood about how regulatory barriers impact trade and investment volumes, 
nor how they affect the economic welfare of various global consumer populations. 
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GATT Round 
Geneva 
Annecy 
Torquay 
Geneva 
Dillon 
Kennedy 
Tokyo 
Uruguay 
*Estimates. 
Table 1: Multilateral Trade Liberalization 
Number of 
Years 
1947 
1949 
1951 
1956 
1960-61 
1964-67 
1973-79 
1986-93 
Trade Volume 
Signatories 
23 
33 
34 
22 
45 
48 
99 
117 
Average Cut 
Covered 
$10.0 billion 
N/A 
N/A 
2.5 
4.9 
40.0 
155.0 
755.0* 
in All Duties 
21.1% 
1.9 
3.0 
3.5 
2.4 
36.0 
29.6 
20.0* 
Sources: Baldwin, Yarbrough, and Yarbrough, various press releases on Uruguay Round. 
Table 2: Regulatory and Dairy NontariffBarriers (NTBs) 
Country 
Australia 
Austria 
Canada 
Finland 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Sweden 
United States 
Total Number 
ofNTBs* 
418 
254 
1471 
302 
323 
393 
709 
300 
Dairy 
NTBs 
23 
22 
37 
13 
4 
10 
7 
43 
Regulatory 
NTBs** 
358 
826 
N/A 
135 
141 
145 
N/A 
Number of Dairy 
Regulatory NTBs 
16 
N/A 
18 
N/A 
4 
4 
3 
N/A 
*Note that barriers (e.g., a single health and safety standard) may be applied against multiple commodities. 
**These are government-reported trade barriers and quite likely offer an incomplete listing. 
Source: Ndaysienga and Kinsey. 
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